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AI trading interfaces: intermediary and adviser licensing across major markets

A developer can keep a limited software role by controlling what its interface actually does, identifying the regulated firm responsible for each service and satisfying the rules of every market it serves. Neutral information, broker introductions, order transmission, personalised recommendations and discretionary trading create different legal questions. The practical decision is which functions the developer will undertake itself, which a properly authorised partner will provide, and which must remain disabled until the required permission or exclusion is established.

25 min read

The US passive-software position offers a particularly specific route for certain introductions and direct order interfaces. Its conditions cannot establish permission in another country. European arranging and order-service rules, Singapore's product-specific exemptions, Kenya's platform category and Australia's advice and dealing rules can capture functions that appear commercially similar. AI trading software regulation therefore begins with an activity and product map. The relevant authorities are examined below, with the contractual and release decisions they require.

Start with the product and the complete user journey

The comparison concerns exchange-traded commodity and broad-index futures, and options on those futures, supplied to retail users through separately regulated intermediaries. It also examines professional-client alternatives. A developer's place of incorporation, operating team and target customers must be established in each case. Securities futures, OTC swaps and contracts for difference, spot crypto-assets, pooled funds and a platform that matches multiple buyers and sellers require separate product and venue analysis.

Use eight configurations when reviewing the interface:

  • Factual display. Fact that changes the decision: Whether prices and positions become recommendations, promotional rankings or invitations to trade.
  • Introduction or marketing. Fact that changes the decision: Who solicits the customer, what is promoted and how the developer is paid.
  • Direct instruction from the user's device. Fact that changes the decision: Whether the user fixes the order and sends it directly to the intermediary, without supplier involvement in that particular order.
  • Supplier receipt and forwarding. Fact that changes the decision: Whether the supplier becomes an actor in the order chain, including through its servers.
  • Personalised recommendation. Fact that changes the decision: Whether an instrument, transaction or portfolio is selected for that user's circumstances.
  • Supplier routing decision. Fact that changes the decision: Whether the supplier chooses a broker, venue or execution parameter after the user's instruction.
  • Trading under standing instructions. Fact that changes the decision: Whether the user has fixed the transaction or delegated future investment choices to the supplier.
  • Asset or credential control. Fact that changes the decision: Whether the supplier can hold, withdraw, transfer, pledge or trade assets through the access granted.

A click approving a recommendation leaves the preceding advice to be classified. A mandate to follow future model decisions can give investment discretion even where the user sets a loss limit or can switch the service off. Conversely, mechanical implementation of a fully specified client order does not by itself establish investment discretion. These distinctions appear in the US passive-software conditions and ESMA's analysis of automatic copying. (CFTC Letter 26-25, pp. 4–6; ESMA Supervisory Briefing on Copy Trading, paragraphs 22–34.)

North America: a defined US route and provincial Canadian permissions

United States: use every condition of the passive-software letter

CFTC Staff Letter 26-25, dated 17 September 2026, extends conditional introducing-broker and associated-person registration relief to qualifying passive software providers. Its predecessor, Letter 26-09 of 17 March 2026, addressed Phantom Technologies and its represented circumstances. The later letter expressly extends beyond crypto software. Both are staff no-action positions; their legal effect follows the issuing Division's authority and the terms of the letters. (Letter 26-25, pp. 3–7 and footnote 14; Letter 26-09, pp. 1, 4–7; 17 CFR 140.99(a)(2).)

The covered activities include neutral market information, user-device software transmitting the user's own orders directly to a Registrant, marketing, introductions and solicitation to particular Registrants. Fees charged to users and revenue-sharing arrangements are expressly contemplated. The architecture requires no affirmative provider involvement in particular orders. Supplier-server receipt and forwarding needs its own analysis and cannot be treated as expressly covered merely because the user selected the trade. The letter excludes provider asset control, express buy/sell signals and discretion over routing or execution. The trades and collateral must use the specified registered market infrastructure. (Letter 26-25, pp. 4–6.)

All ten conditions belong in the implementation plan. They cover disqualification screening and later notification; acknowledgement of relationships, compensation and conflicts; the specified risk disclosure and its exception; direct customer or member relationships and independent access; written promotional controls; exclusion of advertising requiring National Futures Association (NFA) pre-approval; a regulatory undertaking; compliant records; insolvency notification; and the provider's notice, jurisdiction agreement and any required immunity waiver. Each provider and relevant Registrant must execute the undertaking, and the provider files it. The undertaking accepts joint and several liability for the specified violations in covered activities with or on behalf of that Registrant. A privately negotiated indemnity cannot replace that filing. (Letter 26-25, pp. 4–5.)

The advertising condition requires a pre-release category check. NFA Rule 2-29(h) requires prior approval for specified audio or video material containing trading recommendations or profit claims. A provider relying on the letter must exclude advertising that falls into a required pre-approval category. Obtaining approval does not satisfy the letter's prohibition. Other promotional rules address misleading impressions, risk presentation, performance and supervision. Retention should follow the applicable record class under 17 CFR 1.31. (NFA Rule 2-29; Interpretive Notice 9003; 17 CFR 1.31.)

Recommendations and delegated trading require a separate commodity trading adviser analysis. The statutory definition can cover compensated electronic advice without personalisation. Regulation 4.14(a)(9) supplies a particular registration exemption where the provider neither directs accounts nor tailors advice to client positions or circumstances. The small-client alternative also requires no general public holding out. A public app cannot rely only on having fifteen or fewer clients. Even advice qualifying for an exemption can remain outside the letter's express-signal boundary. (7 USC 1a(12); 7 USC 6m; 17 CFR 4.14(a)(9)–(10).)

For a provider relying on Letter 26-25, retain the covered factual display, marketing and direct-order design only with the complete relief package; assess registration or redesign before enabling supplier order handling, signals, routing discretion or account control. Recheck the letter before release and after material changes because withdrawal, modification and the specified future Commission action can end reliance. Licentium's CFTC passive-software news provides the development's background; the feature and undertaking analysis determines implementation.

Canada: establish the province and the exact foreign-firm route

Ontario and Quebec illustrate why a Canadian assessment needs provincial legislation. Ontario's Commodity Futures Act (CFA) addresses dealer and adviser registration and includes solicitation and acts in furtherance within trading. Quebec's Derivatives Act separately regulates derivatives dealers, advisers and representatives. A supplier's direct-order interface therefore needs local analysis even when the same architecture fits the US letter. (Ontario Commodity Futures Act, definition of trade and section 22; Quebec Derivatives Act, sections 3, 54 and 56.)

Cross-border structures offer specific alternatives. Ontario Rule 32-506 sections 3 and 7 provide international-dealer and adviser routes for their defined CFA permitted-client categories, subject to the relevant home-jurisdiction, foreign-contract, disclosure and filing conditions. Incidental dealer advice under section 3(5) excludes managed accounts. The adviser route limits Canadian portfolio-management revenue to 10% on the rule's specified consolidated basis. Section 8 separately permits qualifying international sub-advisers to serve through a registered commodity trading manager, with written duties and the principal's written responsibility for specified client losses; it does not impose sections 3 and 7's permitted-client conditions. Quebec Derivatives Regulation section 11.14 has a separate route for appropriately authorised foreign firms dealing exclusively with accredited counterparties in standardised derivatives offered primarily outside Quebec, with its stated residual obligation. (OSC Rule 32-506, sections 3, 7–8; Quebec Derivatives Regulation, sections 11.2, 11.4 and 11.14.)

These routes require an already qualifying firm and the specified customers. For a retail launch, establish the supplier's provincial dealer and adviser position before enabling introductions, order handling or recommendations. The available foreign-firm rules do not clear every supplier or every Canadian province.

Europe: permission follows the service and the principal relationship

EU framework and Germany

The Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID II) separates reception and transmission of orders, execution, advice and portfolio management. A personal recommendation can arise when the interface presents a transaction as suitable or selects it using personal circumstances. Supplier receipt of an instruction may constitute an order service even where the user made the investment decision. Automatic implementation of future model choices can constitute portfolio management; a veto window or adjustable risk limits can coexist with that discretion. (MiFID II, Article 4; Annex I, Sections A and C; Delegated Regulation 2017/565, Article 9; ESMA Copy Trading Briefing, paragraphs 22–34.)

A tied-agent arrangement is one defined alternative. MiFID II permits the listed promotional, order-transmission, placing and advisory functions as a tied agent under the full and unconditional responsibility of only one investment firm. Its activity list does not include portfolio management. Germany implements a specific route in section 3(2) of the Investment Firm Act (WpIG): the tied agent must have its seat in Germany, stay within the listed activities, act exclusively for the account and under the liability of a qualifying principal, and satisfy the notification requirements. Section 28 adds competence, disclosure, monitoring and record obligations. A broker API contract must be replaced or supplemented by the actual statutory appointment where this route is chosen. (MiFID II, Article 4(1)(29); Article 29; WpIG, sections 3(2), 15 and 28.)

For outsourced critical or important operational functions, Article 31 of Delegated Regulation 2017/565 requires the authorised firm to retain responsibility and effective supervision. The agreement must provide the applicable access, instruction, cooperation and termination rights for that function. Third-country portfolio-management outsourcing has additional conditions. The practical implementation should identify who approves recommendations, strategy versions and execution rules, and who can stop the service. Assigning those rights in a contract is useful only if the authorised firm can exercise them. (Delegated Regulation 2017/565, Articles 31–32.)

Fees and customer classification need separate decisions. Independent advice and portfolio management face particular restrictions on retaining third-party benefits. Other inducements require the applicable conditions, including quality enhancement, client interests and disclosure. Suitability applies to advice and management; complex derivatives cannot be placed into the non-complex execution-only exemption simply because the customer clicks to trade. Professional status changes particular duties and routes while leaving the underlying authorisation question to be resolved. (MiFID II, Article 24; Article 25.)

For Germany, retain a technical role or establish a qualifying tied-agent appointment for its permitted functions; obtain the relevant permission before undertaking independent advice, execution or portfolio management outside that route. Other EU launches require their national implementation, territorial and cross-border checks. The EU framework supplies the categories; each member state's perimeter and remedies still require assessment.

United Kingdom

The UK's arranging analysis reaches beyond who finally executes an order. Article 25 of the Regulated Activities Order distinguishes arrangements bringing about a transaction from arrangements made with a view to transactions. The Article 27 communications exclusion applies to the second limb. Article 26 separately excludes arrangements that do not bring about the transaction from the first limb (RAO, Article 26). FCA guidance identifies added-value facilities, including order checking and transaction processing, as reasons an interface can exceed mere communication. (RAO, Article 25; Article 27; FCA PERG 8.32.6–8.32.9.)

Article 33 excludes only Article 25(2) arrangements and requires an introduction to a qualifying recipient with a view to independent advice or independent exercise of investment discretion. It cannot clear every paid broker referral. Article 53 also requires care: its personal-recommendation limitation has a defined authorised-person scope, so an unlicensed provider cannot assume that all non-personal advice about a particular investment falls outside regulation. Discretionary management is separately addressed by Article 37. (RAO, Article 33; Article 53; Article 37.)

The developer must establish an exclusion, its own permission or a valid appointed-representative arrangement within the principal's permitted scope. Promotions also need their own lawful communication or approval route under section 21 of the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA). Unauthorised activity can affect enforceability and recovery as well as regulatory exposure, subject to the statutory conditions. (FSMA, sections 19, 21, 26–28 and 39.)

Asia: product definitions change the available digital-advice route

Singapore

Singapore's Securities and Futures Act (SFA) requires analysis of dealing in capital markets products and fund management; the Financial Advisers Act separately addresses investment advice and relevant research. The Monetary Authority of Singapore (MAS) recognises that a technology supplier providing software to a financial institution can remain outside these service categories where it performs only that technical function. A supplier providing regulated services to users must assess its own role. (SFA, section 82 and Second Schedule; FAA, section 6 and Second Schedule; MAS Digital Advisory Guidelines, paragraphs 13–16.)

The important product distinction concerns incidental order passing. The exemption discussed in paragraph 18 of the MAS Digital Advisory Guidelines uses specified products. The SFA definition of specified securities-based derivatives contracts excludes futures contracts. Consequently, the cited financial-adviser exemption cannot be extended to the futures baseline set out above merely because the future tracks a securities index. The separate rebalancing treatment in paragraphs 20–21 concerns collective investment schemes. Each exemption needs its actual product and activity conditions. (SFA, section 2 definitions; MAS Digital Advisory Guidelines, paragraphs 16–21.)

Keep the developer's function technical where the licensed institution genuinely supplies the advice and order service. If the developer receives futures instructions, generates client recommendations or operates portfolio decisions, assess the corresponding dealing, advisory and fund-management permissions. Singapore's statutory fund-management definition also requires attention to non-discretionary portfolio management; removing one discretionary feature may leave another regulated activity. Territorial analysis includes services and conduct directed into Singapore. (SFA, sections 2, 82 and 339 and Second Schedule; FAA, section 6(2) and Second Schedule.)

Hong Kong

For futures, Hong Kong distinguishes Type 2 dealing, Type 5 advice and Type 9 asset management. The Securities and Futures Commission (SFC) treats a mere hyperlink differently from a service that induces transactions or performs regulated functions. An approved introducing agent remains within the Type 2 licensing framework. The SFC regards schemes paying members of the public, acting as businesses, commissions or rebates for successful client introductions as generally unacceptable because they may involve unlicensed regulated activity. An affiliate model must address that warning and the introducer's actual licensing position before launch. (Securities and Futures Ordinance, sections 114–115 and Schedule 5; SFC licensing guidance, hyperlinks and introducing agents; SFC Licensing Handbook.)

Personalised rankings and automatic portfolio changes should be assigned to the appropriately licensed advice or management provider. Professional-investor exclusions require their exact transaction and actor conditions; a principal-dealing exclusion does not clear a retail agency interface. Active marketing into Hong Kong can engage the territorial rule even where the developer operates abroad. Establish the applicable statutory exclusions and the partner's licence conditions before treating a particular design as outside licensing. (SFO, section 115 and Schedule 5; SFC Online Distribution and Advisory Platform Guidelines, Chapters 3 and 4.)

Middle East: separate the UAE regimes and Saudi activity categories

UAE onshore, DIFC and ADGM

The Capital Market Authority of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) succeeded the Securities and Commodities Authority under the framework effective from 1 January 2026. Federal Decree-Law 33 of 2025 includes brokerage, advice, management, promotion and introduction among regulated activities. Its territorial provisions address targeting customers in the State from abroad or from a financial free zone, alongside its express exclusion of financial free zones. A Dubai International Financial Centre (DIFC) or Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) establishment therefore needs a separate onshore targeting assessment. The saved rules and transitional provisions require application to the particular existing business; they cannot establish permission for a new unlicensed launch. (Decree-Law 32 of 2025, Articles 2 and 30; Decree-Law 33 of 2025, Articles 2–3 and 82–85.)

Within DIFC, the Dubai Financial Services Authority (DFSA) General Module draws a decisive distinction. Merely receiving and transmitting a client order, without executing it or otherwise committing the client to the transaction, is excluded from dealing as agent under Rule 2.8.3. Such an independent order service can still constitute arranging under Rule 2.9.1. The communications exclusion in Rule 2.9.3 has its own conditions. Outsourced back-office transmission must be distinguished from supplying an arranging service to the customer. Merely selecting the narrower dealing definition can miss the activity that the supplier actually performs. (DFSA GEN, Rules 2.8.3, 2.9.1–2.9.3 and associated guidance.)

DIFC's management analysis also asks who makes the day-to-day investment decisions. For a person that is neither an Authorised Firm nor an Authorised Market Institution, Rule 2.10.2 requires formal written appointment by the asset owner and all day-to-day investment decisions to be taken by an Authorised Firm or Regulated Financial Institution. A supplier's retained power over trading logic and portfolio decisions can defeat the intended allocation. The authorised firm remains responsible for outsourcing and must satisfy the written-control and material-notification requirements. (DFSA GEN, Rules 2.10.2 and 5.3.21–5.3.23.)

ADGM's digital investment-management guidance recognises a pure technology provider and then separately classifies advice, discretionary portfolio decisions and order passing. Passing an order after advice and client consent can be arranging. The custody-introduction exclusion described in the guidance requires a qualifying regulated custodian, with the introducer outside the custodian's group and receiving no remuneration from the custodian or its group. Use that guidance to allocate the functions, then establish the applicable Financial Services and Markets Regulations provisions and Financial Services Permission covering the arrangement. (FSRA Digital Investment Management Guidance, paragraphs 2.4 and 3.2–3.4.)

Saudi Arabia

Saudi Securities Business Regulations define dealing, arranging, managing, advising and custody separately. Arranging focuses on the specified offering, underwriting and corporate-finance functions; it should not be used as a universal label for a secondary-market broker referral. That referral still requires assessment under dealing, advertising, advice and territorial rules, including business with or for persons in the Kingdom. (Securities Business Regulations, Articles 2–4 and 16–19.)

The Capital Market Institutions Regulations, as amended in 2026, make the operating allocation particularly concrete. Article 43(k) requires a capital market institution to obtain approval from Saudi Arabia's Capital Market Authority (CMA) before relying on modern technology to assess suitability, with continuing accuracy and compliance controls. Article 59(d) requires a securities-business delegate to be a capital market institution licensed for the business assigned to it. A broker may procure technology, but the required approval and permissions must cover the regulated functions actually performed. Retail derivatives advertising has a separate suitability condition in Article 35. (Capital Market Institutions Regulations, Articles 35, 43(k) and 59(d), current Arabic text.)

For regulated robo-advisory management, Article 55(e) requires adequate continuing algorithm tests and annual independent tests appropriate to the nature of the systems. Article 55(f) requires the relevant control documents to be retained for ten years after they cease to be used or are amended. Annex 3-2, item 8, requires notification to CMA of portfolio construction and management strategies and any updates at least ten days before client availability. Article 10(f) also requires the applicable portfolio-diversification, foreign-securities supervision and disclosure conditions: portfolios must avoid concentration in one asset or one issuer's securities, and foreign securities require at least equivalent regulatory supervision. Retail management terms must explain the strategy, rebalancing and algorithm operation and risks. A release process must distinguish strategy notification, suitability approval and ordinary technical changes, and allocate each to the licensed institution. (Capital Market Institutions Regulations, Articles 10(f), 55(e)–(f), Annex 3-2 item 8 and Annex 5-2 management terms item 7(8).)

Africa: automated-advice controls and a distinct platform licence

South Africa

South Africa's Financial Advisory and Intermediary Services (FAIS) framework distinguishes advice from intermediary services and covers the relevant derivative products. The intermediary-service test includes conduct for or on behalf of a client or product supplier and the specified transaction, dealing or administration relationship. The Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017 enacted broader wording in Schedule 4's FAIS item 1(j), but General Notice 169 of 2018 did not commence that item. An execution broker's authorisation cannot establish that an independent supplier's advice or intermediary business is covered. The Financial Markets Act exclusion has its own actor and activity limits. (FAIS Act, sections 1, 7 and 45; 2013 amendment, section 181; Financial Sector Regulation Act 9 of 2017, Schedule 4 FAIS item 1(j); General Notice 169 of 2018, paragraph (h), FAIS row; Financial Markets Act 19 of 2012.)

Board Notice 194 of 2017 directly addresses automated advice. Section 38 requires relevant competence and algorithm governance, including testing, controlled changes, reconstruction and the ability to suspend defective advice. Section 39 addresses outsourcing and requires the service provider to hold an authorisation needed for its own activities. Discretionary services require the signed mandate and specified terms under the applicable code. The documentation must therefore identify the authorised provider, mandate, algorithm owner, test evidence and stop authority before enabling personalised or discretionary functions. (Board Notice 194, sections 38–39; Discretionary FSP Code, Chapter II, paragraph 5.)

Kenya

Kenya's 2025 General Licensing Regulations recognise an intermediary service platform provider. The definition covers technology used for aggregation, marketing or distribution of investment products and contains specific exclusions, including technology used by an already licensed institution to improve its own service. An independent customer-facing platform must test the category instead of assuming that a broker connection is enough. Regulation 34 requires a licence and a written agreement with the licensed intermediary addressing responsibilities, liability, disputes, complaints and investor protection, with operational controls. (Legal Notice 197 of 2025, regulations 2 and 34.)

Digital investment advisers have separate conditions under regulations 12–14. The derivatives-broker route also needs the derivatives-market provisions; the statutory dealer terminology cannot simply be applied to every futures activity. Marketing in Kenya can require authorisation even where the product is foreign. The transition for existing platform providers gives those qualifying businesses time to apply; new entrants must establish their own lawful commencement. (General Licensing Regulations, regulations 12–14, 55 and 58; Capital Markets Act, section 2; Derivatives Markets Regulations, regulations 51–53.)

Latin America: distinguish intermediation, advice and the client's order

Brazil

Brazil's securities framework expressly includes the relevant derivatives. A registered investment assessor can prospect clients, receive and transmit orders and provide permitted information as the intermediary's representative under Resolution 178 of the Brazilian Securities and Exchange Commission (CVM). Independent consultancy, analysis and discretionary management have separate regimes. An assessor's authority cannot be extended to client custody, client-exclusive passwords or an unrestricted mandate to act for the investor. (Law 6,385, Article 2(VII)–(VIII); CVM Resolution 178, Articles 3 and 25.)

The user-created automation distinction is narrow. CVM's 2019 guidance treats a robot implementing the investor's own parameters differently from a standardised strategy within the analyst framework. It does not remove every other intermediary or advisory question. Personalised consultancy falls under Resolution 19, and discretionary portfolio management under Resolution 21. Algorithm use preserves the regulated provider's responsibility and the applicable information-access obligations. (CVM Circular 2/2019, paragraphs 14–15; Resolution 19, Articles 1 and 17–18; Resolution 21, Article 19.)

The CVM circular of 19 January 2026 supplies a useful digital journey: an authorised consultant may send the intermediary a recommendation report as order evidence where it contains specific, objective transaction terms and receives the investor's prior express approval. General or discretionary authority fails that treatment. Issuer or distributor benefits may also be passed through fully against the agreed advisory fee, with express authority in the consultancy contract and detailed calculation reports at the same frequency as that fee. The separate restriction on payment for recommending service providers remains relevant to broker rankings and referrals. These are staff interpretations within the consultancy framework; the provider must retain the client's investment decision and comply with its own authorisation and role limits. (CVM Circular 2/2026, paragraphs 4–11; Resolution 19, Articles 1(7), 16(XII) and 18.)

Mexico

Mexico requires a precise bridge between its securities-adviser rules and derivatives-market framework. The Securities Market Law describes personalised securities advice and portfolio administration, while the joint derivatives rules define operators and execution roles for derivatives. The investment-services provisions apply to derivatives within specified brokerage, trust, mandate, commission and administration arrangements. A standalone supplier's pure-derivatives recommendation service therefore requires product and contract classification before assigning a definitive securities-adviser category. (Securities Market Law, Article 225; Joint Derivatives Market Rules, definitions and operator provisions; Investment Services Provisions, Article 1.)

Within the investment-services rules, a transaction resulting from the firm's recommendation remains advised even if the client then instructs it. Securities Market Law Article 227 prohibits an investment adviser's remuneration from domestic or foreign intermediaries except where the intermediary is itself the advisory client. It also prohibits receipt of client money or securities in deposit, administration, custody or as security, except remuneration for the adviser's services. A qualifying sophisticated-client declaration must be signed separately and does not exempt an advised service from client-profile evaluation. Keep independent advice, execution and asset control disabled until the supplier's exact status and the operator arrangement are established. (Investment Services Provisions, Article 1(V); 2023 amendment, Article 2; Securities Market Law, Articles 225–227.)

Oceania: Australia and New Zealand draw different advice boundaries

Australia

Australia regulates both general and personal financial product advice, alongside dealing that can include arranging. Guidance from the Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) treats order routing and integrated transaction facilities as capable of arranging even where the customer makes the investment decision. The Corporations Regulations provide a narrow contact-referral exemption with conditions including disclosure of the benefit. A paid introduction must satisfy that actual provision or another lawful route. (Corporations Act, sections 766A–766C and 911A; ASIC RG 36, paragraphs 36.43–36.44 and Table 4; Corporations Regulations, regulation 7.6.01(1)(e).)

The 2026 managed discretionary account instrument took effect on 26 September 2026. Its framework can apply where the customer contributes trading authority while assets remain elsewhere. The required retail agreement and investment programme, review and termination provisions need to be built into the service. Check whether the futures are non-limited recourse products under the instrument. Where they are, obtain the specified separate written consent and risk acknowledgement and meet the associated controls. For retail personal advice supplied through a computer program, section 961(6) identifies the provider for the personal-advice duties. (ASIC Instrument 2026/720, sections 2, 6 and 19 and notional sections 912AEB–912AEC; Corporations Act, section 961(6).)

Keep permission requirements in force separate from changes not yet in force. The 2026 market-integrity amendments commence on 17 March 2028; the enacted foreign financial-services-provider reforms commence on 8 April 2027, while, as at 18 November 2026, ASIC CS 68 remains a consultation on proposed guidance and relief (2026 amending Act, section 2, table item 3 and Schedule 2). The ASIC market-integrity update explains the scheduled trading-system changes. A new launch still needs a present Australian financial services licence (AFSL), representative or verified exemption route. (ASIC Instrument 2026/574, section 2; ASIC Instrument 2026/575, section 2; ASIC CS 68.)

New Zealand

New Zealand's Financial Markets Conduct Act excludes merely providing factual information, merely carrying out a client's instructions and recommendations about a kind of product without recommending a particular product from financial advice. An exclusion from advice leaves separate trading, service-registration and discretionary-management questions. A retail financial advice service needs the applicable provider-licensing or authorised-body structure, including where advice is supplied online. The Financial Advice Code 2025, effective 1 November 2025, supplies the applicable conduct and competence standards for regulated retail advice. (FMCA, Schedule 5, clause 7; FMA innovation and licensing guidance; Financial Service Providers Act, section 5; section 7A; FMA authorised-body guidance.)

Discretionary investment management turns on authority to decide which financial products are acquired or disposed of for an investor. The statutory text preserves that classification despite a client's right to countermand; the guidance of the Financial Markets Authority (FMA) on discretionary investment management services (DIMS) corroborates the investment-decision boundary. Identify the mandate, licensing position, investment authority and breach response before enabling model-controlled trading. Wholesale status must satisfy the applicable test; registering on the financial service providers register alone does not confer every required licence. (FMCA, section 432A, historical consolidation; FMA DIMS guidance, updated 2 June 2026; FMA licensing guidance.)

Turn the comparison into agreements and release decisions

The first agreement is the user's contract with the firm actually providing each regulated service. Identify the account provider, adviser or manager; the instruments and territory; authority to place or alter orders; charges; risk disclosures; and complaint route. Distinguish a fully specified instruction from authority to make future trading decisions. The contractual authority analysis in AI agents and binding contracts helps define what the system may commit the parties to. Financial-services permissions must then cover the authorised conduct.

The developer–intermediary agreement should translate that allocation into operational rights. Set who accepts orders, validates recommendations, owns the suitability assessment, approves promotional material and controls strategy changes. Give the responsible institution access to relevant records and testing, powers to reject outputs and suspend the service, incident cooperation and a workable exit. Add the jurisdiction-specific instruments: the US filed undertaking, a valid agent or representative appointment, Kenya's platform agreement, or Saudi approval and notification steps. The governing authorities above determine which terms and acts are mandatory. Service levels, loss allocation, insurance and detailed acceptance tests are additional commercial protections.

A common release process should preserve a versioned description of each feature, product, user class and market; identify the legal actor at every stage; record the permission or exclusion and its conditions; and link the approved interface to the customer documents and partner commitments. Keep a feature disabled where a decisive permission, legal point or factual condition remains unresolved. This is a recommended control process for applying the rules above, rather than a single worldwide statutory checklist.

Reopen the assessment when a model begins ranking for an individual, a server starts receiving orders, routing becomes discretionary, credentials gain trading or withdrawal powers, remuneration changes, or marketing reaches another market. Separate routine code maintenance from a change to the regulated service. The Saudi strategy-notification rule, South African algorithm controls, US relief conditions and European outsourcing duties show why the release owner needs both technical evidence and legal approval of the changed activity.

The workable options are a genuinely technical supplier role; a defined local agent, representative or other limited permission route; the developer's own relevant authorisation; or a narrower product release. Choose between them using the functions the business intends to retain and the obligations the principal can actually undertake. A partner's execution permission must cover its own service, and every additional provider's role must have its own legal basis.

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